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Soviet violations broader than told

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The Reagan administration's report on Soviet arms control violations contains strong accusations, but the evidence presented is substantially weaker than that which the administration has in hand, according to sources familiar with the report.

Mr. Reagan, in his speech on U.S.-Soviet relations yesterday, devoted only one paragraph to the violations report. He cited "mounting evidence" that the Soviets have violated existing agreements and treaties.

A senior State Department official who briefed reporters Friday on the report, which is to be

sent to the Congress shortly, said "we are not seeking to make a propaganda issue" of the violations. But, he added, "We have to recognize that this is not an issue that can easily be swept under the rug."

The official, who spoke on condition he not be identified, outlined seven areas of Soviet arms control violations to be cited in the secret, 55-page report.

In many cases, he would not elaborate or deviate from the report's carefully crafted language. However, other secret and top-secret reports obtained by The Washington Times reveal the fuller extent of evidence on arms control violations in the hands of U.S. military and intelligence agencies.

• Regarding the Biological and

Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol, the Soviets "have repeatedly violated their obligations," the official said. He cited use of Soviet chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan as specific examples of the violations.

The full report, however, also is expected to raise serious concerns over Soviet development of biological weapons. Special attention will be drawn to an explosion at the Sverdlovsk biological warfare institute in central Russia.

According to a secret report by the Defense Intelligence Agency, some 200 people died of anthrax when a laboratory at a biological production or storage site exploded in 1979, releasing highly toxic anthrax spores into the air and, through ventilator shafts, to nearby factory buildings.

The DIA report concludes there is "strong evidence" that Sverdlovsk contains "illegal production or storage of biological agents and weapons."

• Construction of "a large, phased-array radar constructed near Krasnoyarsk, in the central U.S.S.R., is almost certainly a violation of a legal obligation" of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the official said.

The radar "is well deployed within the interior" of the Soviet Union and is facing inward — two elements in violation of the ABM Treaty. The concern here is that the radar could be used as part of a battle management system for a large-scale ABM system, the official added.

The DIA, however, warned in a secret report on July 15, 1983, that the giant radar is "ideally suited for ballistic missile tracking and target acquisition."

"The radar would also have the technological potential to provide target tracking data should the Soviets decide to deploy a national ABM system," DIA warned.

The DIA said the radar is "almost identical" to large, operational arrays at Lyaki (near the Caspian Sea) and Pechora (in the northwest Soviet Union). Other radar facilities under construction at Sary Shagan, Michelevka and near Moscow are similar in design, the DIA reported.

• On the testing of nuclear weapons, the administration report will cite "verification constraints" that precluded reaching "a conclusive judgment whether the Soviets are violating the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty." But, he added, "We believe it likely that Soviet test-

ing violates their obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT agreement."

The official pointed out that the TTBT allows for underground atomic testing of yields up to 150 kilotons, and that ambiguity remains due to inadequate U.S. verification techniques. He said there have been 11 tests that exceeded the 150-kiloton limit, one of which

may have been as high as 300 kilotons.

A Defense Department analysis of Soviet nuclear testing, which was declassified but which officials later attempted to reclassify, presents a stronger picture. It shows 14 Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests since 1978 that were above the 150-kiloton limit.

Of these, several were at 250 kilotons or more, and at least five were at or above the 300-kiloton level — twice that allowed by TTBT.

• "In view of the available information," the senior State Department official said, "we cannot reach a conclusive judgment whether SS-16 ICBMs are deployed." There are, however, "certain activities under way" at the Plesetsk testing facility indicating that SS-16s "are probably deployed there."

At issue here is whether the Soviets violated SALT II by operationally deploying in a mobile mode the SS-16 intercontinental ballistic missile. While citing "real concerns" over the SS-16 at Plesetsk, the official declined to comment on what exactly has been observed due to "sources and methods" of intelligence gathering.

A top-secret report of Soviet SS-16 deployment by Defense Department analysts states "there is converging evidence from multiple intelligence sources" that the Soviet mobile SS-16 is "deployed operationally at the Plesetsk test range."

"DIA, military intelligence agencies, and NSA (National Security Agency) all believe that about 180 to 200 SS-16 missiles" are deployed

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